Morphological Computing of Cognition and Intelligence, MORCOM 2021-Online Conference

The theme of the conference, “Morphological Computing of Cognition and Intelligence” (MORCOM 2021), focused on the unconventional forms of computing, which bring the promise of more efficient intelligent and cognitive computing. The present editorial, written by the organizers of the conference, reports the ideas and goals of MORCOM 2021 and provides an overview of the contributions

Conference: Morphological, Natural, Analog and Other Unconventional Forms of Computing for Cognition and Intelligence, Berkeley 2019

The leading theme of the 2019 Summit of International Society for the Study of Information held 2–6 June 2019 at The University of California at Berkeley was the question “Where is the I in AI and the meaning of Information?” The question addresses one of the central issues not only for scientific research and philosophical reflection, but also for technological, economic, and social practice. The Conference “Morphological, Natural, Analog, and Other Unconventional Forms of Computing for Cognition and Intelligence” (MORCOM 2019) was focused on this theme from the perspective of unconventional forms of computing. The present paper, written by the organizers of the conference, reports the objectives of MORCOM 2019 and provides an overview of the contributions

IS4SI SUMMIT Berkeley 2019

The leading theme of the 2019 Summit of the International Society for the Study of Information,\ua0held 2–6 June 2019 at the University of California at Berkeley, was the question “Where is the I in AI,\ua0and the meaning of Information?” This question addresses one of the central issues not only for scientific research and philosophical reflection, but also for technological, economic and social\ua0practice.There is no doubt that the progress in designing computer based technological devices known\ua0as Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems has transformed the life and work of almost the entire human\ua0population. Moreover, this transformation continues and accelerates. At the same time, there is no one commonly accepted definition of AI. This is a reflection of the fact that there is no commonly\ua0accepted definition of intelligence in general. Moreover, there is no agreement about human\ua0intelligence, and psychologists and cognitive scientists frequently opt for multiple intelligences\ua0because, in essence, intelligence is a contextual trait. Thus, an important goal of researchers is to\ua0more definitely qualify the natural intelligence of people and maybe other living beings, making it\ua0possible to understand whether artificial intelligence, i.e., the intelligence of a machine, is the same,\ua0and how it is possible to estimate this intelligence

Viral targeting of DEAD box protein 3 reveals its role in TBK1/IKKε-mediated IRF activation

Viruses are detected by different classes of pattern recognition receptors (PRRs), such as Toll-like receptors and RIG-like helicases. Engagement of PRRs leads to activation of interferon (IFN)-regulatory factor 3 (IRF3) and IRF7 through and TBK1 and consequently IFN-β induction. Vaccinia virus (VACV) encodes proteins that manipulate host signalling, sometimes by targeting uncharacterised proteins. Here, we describe a novel VACV protein, K7, which can inhibit PRR-induced IFN-β induction by preventing TBK1/IKKε-mediated IRF activation. We identified DEAD box protein 3 (DDX3) as a host target of K7. Expression of DDX3 enhanced Ifnb promoter induction by TBK1/IKKε, whereas knockdown of DDX3 inhibited this, and virus- or dsRNA-induced IRF3 activation. Further, dominant-negative DDX3 inhibited virus-, dsRNA- and cytosolic DNA-stimulated Ccl5 promoter induction, which is also TBK1/IKKε dependent. Both K7 binding and enhancement of Ifnb induction mapped to the N-terminus of DDX3. Furthermore, virus infection induced an association between DDX3 and IKKε. Therefore, this study shows for the first time the involvement of a DEAD box helicase in TBK1/IKKε-mediated IRF activation and Ifnb promoter induction

Philosophical Foundations for the Concept of Information: Selective and Structural Information

Abstract. The most fundamental question in the philosophy of information "What is information?" has not received yet a definite answer free from commonly recognized deficiencies. In my earlier work I have proposed a definition of information as an identification of the variety. The definition is based on the concept of the one-many relation, a philosophical theme as old as philosophy itself. The rich tradition of the theme established through the centuries of philosophical discourse is in a clear contrast to the common sense concepts such as "uncertainty" usually utilized in attempts to set foundations for the concept of information. An identification of the variety can have two basic forms of a selection of one out many in the variety, or of the structure uniting the variety (many) into one. The distinction of the forms of identification leads to the distinction between the selective and structural information. However, since every occurrence of one type of information is always accompanied by the other, selective and structural information can be considered just different manifestations of the uniform concept of information. The selective information can be easily identified with the concept of information in its usual understanding. The structural manifestation of information has been considered usually in the context of integration of information. In the present paper the analysis of the concept of information based on the one-many relation is being carried out in the three perspectives. First, the philosophical aspects of information are considered. Then, the concept of information is being identified in a selection of very different domains. For instance, Hutcheson's concept of beauty dominating classical aesthetics since 18 th century, understood as "unity in variety," provides an example of an idea very close to structural information. Integration of the neuronal activity in the brain considered as a basis for consciousness by Edelman and his collaborators can be also viewed as an example of structural information in a different domain. Finally, an attempt is being made to identify a mathematical formalism which reflects the distinction of the selective and structural information. ©2005 by MDPI (http://www.mdpi.org). Reproduction for non commercial purposes permitted. 2 Introduction In this article I am revisiting my earlier proposal of an answer to the question "What is information?" in the conceptual framework of the one-many relation In spite of the frequent occurrence of the word "information" in a large variety of contexts, there is no commonly accepted answer to the question about its meaning. Even worse, there is no agreement whether it is possible to provide a uniform answer independent from the context in which the word "information" is used. The views are scattered between the two extreme positions, between the belief that there are as many meanings of the word "information" as domains of its application, and the view that different contexts differentiate only manifestations of the uniform entity which can and should be clearly and properly defined. While I belong to supporters of the latter position, I cannot accept any of the numerous former attempts to define the meaning of this uniform concept of information. In particular, I cannot accept the two most popular formulations of the definition of information as a "resolution, reduction of uncertainty" I have provided several critical arguments against the earlier attempts to define information elsewhere One of the most common errors in the attempts to grasp the meaning of information was an extrapolation of the conceptual and analytic framework of the study of communication (carried within the "conduit metaphor of information&quot

Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies—Part 2

This is a short presentation by the Guest Editors of the series of Special Issues of the journal Philosophies under the common title "Contemporary Natural Philosophy and Philosophies" in which we present Part 2. The series will continue, and the call for contributions to the next Special Issue will appear shortly